American Constitutional Law

Oral Arguments

Wednesday, May 24th

6:00 p.m.

Richard J. Daley Center

Courtroom #2110

American Constitutional Law

Case Assignments

Reason is the life of the law; nay, the common law itself is nothing else but reason…The law which is perfection of reason.

Sir Edward Coke, First Institute (1628)

One precedent creates another.  They soon accumulate and constitute law.  What yesterday was fact, today is doctrine.

The Letters of Junius, Dedication to the English Nation (1769)

Your role is to serve as an advocate for your client, and you should do so without passion or prejudice.  To successfully accomplish this, work closely with your team to develop oral arguments based upon sound legal reasoning and the historical body of case law.

Bond

Vs.

United States

Luke Chmura

Martin Klein

Alex Harris

Jonathon Valencia

 

Colin Brown

Brian Andriamahefa

Daniel Rosenbaum

Sante Fe

Vs.

Doe

Sarah Mysiewicz

David Peterson

Ben Cleary

Anton Durbak

Sarah Mickie

Andrew Abolt

Eduardo Franco

 


Santa Fe Independent School District v. Jane Doe

99-0062

Oral Argument: Wednesday, May 24, 2000

Appealed From:  5th Circuit Court of Appeals (168 F.3d 806) 

Subject:  School prayer, establishment clause, football game invocations

Question(s) presented:  Whether the school district's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the 1st Amendment's Establishment Clause.

Facts:  In April 1993, a 7th grade history teacher in Santa Fe handed out fliers advertising a Baptist religious revival.  One of the 7th graders asked the teacher if non-Baptists were invited to attend, prompting the teacher to inquire about her religious affiliation.  On hearing that she was Mormon, the teacher launched into a diatribe about the non-Christian, cult-like nature of Mormonism, and its general evils.  Two days later, the girl's mother complained to the Santa Fe school district.

Because the teacher's actions violated a school district policy that prohibited the distribution of religious literature in class or the verbal abuse of any student, the teacher was given a written reprimand and directed to apologize to the family and to her class.

During 1992-93 and 1993-94 school years, the Santa Fe school district allowed students to read Christian prayers from the stage at graduation ceremonies and over the public address system at home football games.  The prayers were delivered as "invocations" or "benedictions," and typically were given by officers of the student council, though district representatives pre-screened the texts and retained control over the programs and facilities during the reading of the prayers, including the ability to cut off the microphone or remove the speaker.

That 7th grader attended a number of the football games.

In April 1995, the girl's parents and another family filed suit in district court against the school district, claiming the district was violating the 1st Amendment's separation of church and state.  Because the dispute created bitter feelings in Santa Fe, the two families were permitted to file the lawsuit under the pseudonym, "Jane Doe."

In December 1996, U.S. District Judge Sam Kent held the school district's policies unconstitutional.

Kent said that prayer can remain part of the school district's graduation ceremonies and pre-game activities but only if the students organized and presented the prayer, and if the prayer was non-sectarian and non-persuasive.

The Santa Fe school board appealed, indicating to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals that the judge's order required that the name "Jesus" be eliminated from the student-led prayers.

A divided 5th Circuit panel in February 1999 decided that students may not use the school's public address system for prayers at sporting events, but held the graduation prayers to be constitutional.

Writing for the majority, Judge Jacques Weiner Jr. said that a distinction must be made between graduation ceremonies and sporting events because commencement exercises are of a more solemn nature and once-in-a-lifetime phenomena.

"Here, we are dealing with a setting [football and basketball games] far less solemn and extraordinary, and a quintessentially Christian prayer," Weiner Jr. wrote.

In applying three Supreme Court tests-the Lemon, Coercion, and Endorsement tests-the majority held the school board's practices unconstitutional.

"By failing to prohibit sectarian and proselytizing prayers, [the school board's policy] has the primary effect of advancing and unconstitutionally endorsing religion," Weiner Jr. wrote.

Judge E. Grady Jolly dissented, writing that "for the first time in our court's history, the majority expressly exerts control over the content of its citizens' prayers.  And it does so notwithstanding that the Supreme Court has never required, suggested, hinted or implied that the Constitution controls the content of its citizens' prayers in any context."

Santa Fe school district superintendent Richard Ownby then warned students that anyone who violated the appeals court ban on prayers would be disciplined.

In September 1999, on the day before Santa Fe High School was to play its season-opening football game against Crosby High, the parents of 17-year-old Marian Ward sued the school district to allow her to offer prayer during her pre-game speech.

Hours before the Friday night game, U.S. District Judge Sim Lake of Houston issued a temporary restraining order barring the school district from punishing Ward if she led her prayer.  In apparent opposition to the 5th Circuit opinion, Lake's ruling said the school guidelines "clearly prefer atheism over any religious faith."

That night, Ward said in her prayer, "God, thank you for this evening.  Thank you for all the prayers that were lifted up this week for me.  I pray that you'll bless each and every person here tonight."

Texas Gov. George W. Bush joined the attorneys general of eight other states in filing a brief urging the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the district's appeal.

The Court granted certiorari on Nov. 15, 1999.  The justices told the school district and the parents to argue specifically on the constitutionality of policies permitting student-led and -initiated prayers at football games.  The Court also allowed the Rutherford Institute to file an amicus brief in the case.


Santa Fe Independent School District v. Jane Doe

Petitioner’s Brief

Counsel: Cleary, Ben; Mysiewicz, Sarah; Peterson, David

This is a clear-cut case of the basic rights enforced by the First Amendment.  The Bill of Rights of the Constitution indisputably states that, “Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  The latter means that the government of the United States should not promote a certain religion, and at no time should the government support any sort of religion.  The respondent will likely argue that prayer in schools is an exercise of religion.  However, as stated by President Clinton, Janet Reno, and others in “Religion in the Public Schools: A Joint Statement of Current Law”, student led prayer-as long as it is positive, nondiscriminatory, unpersuasive, and nonobligatory-should be allowed in public school’s non-mandatory, extracurricular functions.

The Supreme Court has made several conflicting decisions regarding this particular section of the Constitution, making it quite complicated to deal with.  Most of the cases dealing with it have ended up in favor of completely segregating schools from religion, but all of these cases involve a situation where a teacher or school authority figure is leading the religious practices.  The specific prayer discussed in this case was not educational or persuasive (as well as completely non-compulsory) and was led by a student.  The First Amendment states that only proprietaries of the state cannot favor one religion over another, and cannot specifically lead prayers or other religious activities; it does not forbid students from voicing their own religious beliefs and convictions through prayer.  Disallowing a student to voice her or his opinions, even in prayer, is a direct offense of the First Amendment’s freedom of speech provision. 

One pertinent Supreme Court case is Zorach v. Clauson, in which a religious group that helped programs outside public school buildings was found to be complying with the Constitution, since it did not involve religious instructions inside the school classroom.  While the prayer that came into question in this case was also not inside of the classroom, there are numerous cases where prayer or religious practice is allowed in the classrooms, such as when schools throughout America have students stand every morning to recite The Pledge of Allegiance and in that display of nationalism, the words clearly state “one nation under God…”  Inside courts and on dollar bills across the nation the phrase “In God We Trust” are clearly posted and if these practices of non-offensive beliefs in God are endorsed by the government then surely these lesser, student-led acts should be allowed.  There are even scenes of God, particularly Jesus Christ, in cities-governmental entities-across the nation.  Advertisements on billboards, prayer on television, at times there seems to be no end.  How can we, as a nation, presume to limit a student’s rights of free speech and yet allow people who don’t have their lives centered around learning speak freely of their beliefs and convictions?

      

The respondents will try to persuade you that any religious act in schools and government sponsored facilities directly defies the Establishment Clause, but to not allow students to voice their beliefs in a non-offensive manner and in a voluntary situation is even more clearly a violation of the First Amendment.  They will also try to argue the voluntary manner of the situation, however extracurricular activities tend to be optional and the fans in attendance choose to be there.

           

To give the respondents what they want, which is force the government to step in and start a process of censoring the school, is the first step towards a totalitarian society.  Siding with the respondents is equivalent to taking away American’s most cherished privilege, freedom of speech. 


Santa Fe Independent School District v. Jane Doe

Respondent’s Brief

Counsel: Abolt, Andrew; Durbak, Anton; Franco, Eduardo; Mickie, Sarah

In the case of Santa Fe v. Jane Doe, the Respondent's counsel is trying to uphold the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals decision, in favor of Jane Doe, and to prove that the school district of Santa Fe is endorsing religion in a public school.  The problem in this case comes down to the clarity of the First Amendment.  Is this case about the freedom of speech or a violation of separation of church and state?  The answer revolves around the fact that students were forced to listen to a religious "benediction" against their will.  The petitioner's argument of freedom of speech and religion, does not apply to a situation where students are forced to listen to it.  They may argue that the students could just not listen to it, but the problem with that is that the Santa Fe School District could then broadcast prayers over the public speaker, which disables the student's right not to listen.  A Fifth Circuit panel also decided that the public address system could not be used for prayer at sporting events. 

In his majority opinion in Abington School District v. Schempp, Justice Tom Clark wrote that the “state is firmly committed to a position of neutrality.”  In Lemon v. Kurtzman the Court further articulated its view on the Establishment Clause by establishing a three-prong test in which the government must not: (1) endorse nor disapprove of religion; (2) advance nor inhibit religion, and; (3) unnecessarily entangle itself with the internal affairs of the religion.  The school has complete authority to remove the microphone from the student, and by not doing so it violated the establishment clause by not being neutral.  In fact, Santa Fe showed signs of endorsing religion.  The school also created a relationship between the state and religion that entangled their internal affairs. 

In regards to the pre-game ceremonies at Santa Fe football games, there are people who are forced to be there by official school policy, such as cheerleaders and band members, for the pre-game ceremonies that includes prayers.  These persons had no choice but to be on the premises when the prayer was read.  Certainly, people in the stands could have come late to the game to avoid the prayer reading, but they shouldn't have to forfeit their ability to see the entire game just to miss the prayer.  Jane Doe was one of these people who were in the stands and heard this prayer.

The question of what a prayer is may come into play in this case.  The Petitioners will likely argue that in fact that there is a lot of praying around this country such as on our money (“In God We Trust”) and even in our Pledge of Allegiance, but is this the same as a prayer?  A prayer as defined by Webster's Dictionary is a “reverent petition made to God, a god, or another object of worship; in other words a conversation with God.”  When you are praying you are conversing with God, talking with Him, but when you say the Pledge of Allegiance you are not praying to God, you are acknowledging that you pledge and hope that something is looking over this beautiful nation of ours.  ‘God’ is a very broad word, though it is the "exact name" of the superior being in one religion, that doesn't mean that the word God means the God of Christianity, but it could mean ‘something superior.’  Herein lies the fault of the Santa Fe School District because they weren’t using God in the broad sense.  Instead, they were praying to Jesus Christ, a specific deity of Christianity.  This act is against everything a public school can and should stand for, a public place where students may learn about and enjoy different cultures, but not be forced to participate in a specific aspect of that culture.  We ask the court to uphold the previous judgments and not allow the students, our future, be forced into anything especially something that is against our Constitution and the separation of Church and State.


Bond v. United States

98-9349

Oral Argument: Wednesday, May 24, 2000

Appealed From:  5th Circuit Court of Appeals (167 F. 3d 225)

Subject:  Border searches, 4th Amendment

Question(s) presented:  Whether a search occurs for 4th Amendment purposes when a law enforcement officer manipulates a bus passenger's personal carry-on luggage to determine its contents.

Facts:  Steven DeWayne Bond set out on a cross-country trip, heading from California to Arkansas aboard a Greyhound bus.  While passing through Texas, the bus stopped at a Border Patrol checkpoint in Sierra Blanca for an immigration inspection.

At the checkpoint, Border Patrol Agent Cesar Cantu moved through the bus, heading from front to back as he verified the immigration status of each passenger.  Once he completed this brief check, Cantu returned to the front of the bus.  Along the way, he stopped to feel and squeeze all the carry-on luggage stored in the Greyhound's overhead bins.

Something in Bond's bag made him stop.

Cantu asked to open the bag.  "Go ahead," Bond replied.  Inside the bag the agent found a brick of methamphetamine wrapped in a pair of pants.  After Cantu told him his Miranda rights, Bond admitted he was taking the drugs to be sold in Little Rock, Ark.

Bond was indicted on charges of conspiracy to possess and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.  Prior to trial, Bond claimed that Cantu's search was illegal and moved to suppress the brick of drugs found in his bag.  A federal judge denied the motion, and a district court convicted Bond of both charges and sentenced him to 57 months in prison.

In a brief opinion, a unanimous 5th Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed, concluding that because Bond consented to the agent's search of the inside of his bag, the court needed to decide only whether Cantu violated the defendant's 4th Amendment rights by squeezing the bag prior to that search.

How does the court determine whether an item has been searched?  According to the previous standard, "Government action amounts to a search when it infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to accept as reasonable."  The appeals court ruled that Cantu's squeezing the bag did not infringe Bond's privacy because Bond had placed his bag in a common area of the bus.

"By placing his bag in the overhead bin, Bond knowingly exposed it to the public and, therefore, did not have a reasonable expectation that his bag would not be handled or manipulated by others," the court stated in its opinion.

However, Bond said Cantu's action amounted to a search because the agent manipulated his bag in a different manner than other passengers would.  The appeals court rejected this argument, referring to a 1986 Supreme Court decision that a defendant who grew marijuana plants in his backyard knowingly exposed the plants to aerial observation.  According to the Court, the fact that the officers were trained to recognize marijuana plants was irrelevant.

Thus in the Bond case, the court concluded, "The fact that Agent Cantu's manipulation of Bond's bag was calculated to detect contraband is irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes."

The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on Oct. 12, 1999, allowed Bond to proceed in forma pauperis, and limited review to the first question presented in Bond's petition.


Bond v. United States

Petitioner’s Brief

Counsel: Chmura, Luke; Harris, Alex; Klein, Martin; Valencia, Jonathan

 

Questions Presented:

1)      Whether an Officer searching the exterior of luggage in an overhead area of a bus is considered a “search” in the terms of the Fourth Amendment.

2)      Whether the bus, where the petitioner was on board, was unlawfully detained after the immigration inspections were completed.

3)      Whether Bond knew that he could refuse the immigration officer’s request to search the bag.

4)      Whether there is any evidence that consent was voluntarily given.

 

Petitioner’s Argument

            Border stops are unconstitutional and unlawful.  In the case of Florida v. Bostik the court found that during border searches, the passenger does not know that he has the right to leave the bus to avoid any questioning by police.  By stopping the bus, the officers seized the bus and any persons on it, breaking their 4th Amendment right.

            The border agent checking the bus, without a warrant, induced a level of intimidation causing the petitioner to give him involuntary consent.  In the case of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte the court of appeals stated that if a person is in search and is not in custody then his/her 4th and 14th Amendment rights are being broken.  And if he is being searched that any requests made must be responded voluntarily and not forced upon the person.  In this same case the court also stated that it should be taken into account whether the person being searched has no knowledge of his right to refuse a request or answer a question from law enforcement.

            Because the Immigration Agent had no warrant, he had no right to search the petitioner’s bag.  Though the petitioner did give consent to the agent, it was never mentioned that the bag would be opened.  In the case of Florida v. Jimeno the state trial court stated that though Jimeno gave the officer consent to view the bag, he never stated that the officer could open the bag and view its contents.  The court also said that because of this fact, the cocaine that was in the bag might not be used against the petitioner.

Respondent’s Arguments

By allowing the agent to examine the bag, the petitioner’s 4th Amendment rights were “waved.”  In the case of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the court stated that giving a policeman his/her consent to do something is not the same as if the officer had a warrant, because even though consent was given, the officer had no legal right to touch the person’s property.  The petitioner put his bag in the overhead bin, which is a public area.  The problem with this is the fact that the bag is in a closed box above and out of the sight of any passenger, making it privatized.  Also, when considering the fact that the bus stopped at an immigration checkpoint and nothing more, the agent’s act of searching the bins was a violation of the 4th Amendment because no person on that bus was in seizure making it incapable for them to be searched, therefore, their property and themselves were protected by the Constitution, which means that the agent abused his badge and authority.


Bond v. United States

Respondent’s Brief

Counsel: Andriamahefa, Brian; Brown, Colin; Rosenbaum, Daniel

The question presented in this case is whether it is considered a search when an officer manipulates a passenger’s luggage to determine its contents.  It was in fact not a search because Steven Bond knowingly exposed his bag to public handling and observation.

When broken down, a search occurs when two conditions are met.  The first is when the person claiming contravention, displays a personal expectation of privacy.  The second is when society interprets that expectation as objectively reasonable.  Therefore, when an infringement on one’s Fourth Amendment rights occurs, the person being violated must previously show their private needs and the wrongdoer has to know that those needs are deemed sound by the rest of society.  This was established by the Court in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988).

In addition, the Court has stated that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  To follow up with this, the Court has said that law enforcement officers “may see what may be seen ‘from a public vantage point’” without breaching the Fourth Amendment.  Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989).

This relates to the case because the Petitioner, Steven Bond, decided to transport the soft canvas bag, carrying the large brick of narcotics, across the country, placed on the bus’s overhead rack.  It is known that people on transports, such as buses, and employees for the transports often handle luggage stored in shared areas.  Other passengers might have to store their luggage too or have to remove it.  Either way, interfering on one’s luggage is common on such transport vessels.  The Petitioner knew there was a chance someone might have to manipulate his bag, yet still kept it there anyway.  Therefore, he intentionally exposed it to the public, and did not have reasonable expectation that his bag would not be handled by others.  It has been stated that an officer’s act of “squeezing a piece of soft-sided luggage and thereby feeling the unmistakable outline of a gun [or other contraband] does not constitute a search.”  United States v. Russell, 670 F.2d 323, 325.  This justifies Officer Cantu’s actions.

Furthermore, Steven Bond subjected himself to a border search while passing through Texas.  By definition, any person or thing coming into the United States is subject to a search by that fact alone, whether or not suspicion is aimed at that particular person or thing.  United States v. Odland, 502 F.2d 148.  Everyone had the same chance of having his or her overhead luggage handled, therefore Bond was not singled out.  The border checkpoint served not only as an immigration checkpoint, but also as a checkpoint for searches of possessions.

It should be stated that Officer Cantu did not manipulate the bag in a different manner than other passenger’s would have done.  Any passenger that would have touched the bag for any reason would definitely notice the large size of the brick of meth-amphetamine.  Officer Cantu simply felt the outside of Bond’s bag, and in doing so noted the unusual object that took up one third of the bag’s space.  So Officer Cantu perceived what any other passenger would have perceived.

            The Petitioners might argue that border stops have been considered unconstitutional and unlawful in the past.  That is irrelevant due to the fact that border stops are still functional, maintained, and enforced by the U.S. Government.  The Petitioners might additionally state that Officer Cantu intimidated Bond and forced him to answer.  Officer Cantu asked a straightforward question in a reasonable tone and Bond responded promptly.  Bond chose to answer, and if he knew of his rights to refuse to answer an officer, he could have chose not to respond.